No one has a well developed solution to Duhem's problem, the problem of how experimental evidence warrants revision of our theories. Deborah Mayo proposes a solution to Duhem's problem in route to her more ambitious program of providing a philosophical account of inductive inference and experimental knowledge. This paper is a response to Mayo's Error Statistics (ES) program, paying particular attention to her response to Duhem's problem. It turns out that Mayo's purported solution to Duhem's problem is very significant to her project, for the epistemic license claimed by ES and the philosophical underpinnings to her account of experimental knowledge depend on this solution. By introducing the partition problem, I argue that ES fails to solve Duhem's problem and therefore fails to provide an adequate account of experimental knowledge.
1. Introduction. Duhem's problem arises when we have experimental evidence that is contrary to a theory's predictions. Given this situation, we have reason to believe that at least one of the statements of the theory plus auxiliaries is false: the conjunction of theoretical statements, the auxiliaries, and the experimental evidence statement is inconsistent. But do we have adequate grounds for determining which statement among the set is to blame? Pierre Duhem argued that such grounds are not found in laboratory notebooks per se but rather in the good sense of their authors. The very nature of experimental evidence renders its bearing on theory essentially opaque. So, according to Duhem, treating experimental evidence as if it determined which statement is to blame is mistaken. Most the statement when it is false (i.e., measures the probability of committing a Type-I error). So, under ES a statement (hypothesis) h is shown to be in error as a result of e' only if the alternative hypothesis A has been shown to pass a severe test (Mayo 1996b, 108) . Since often there is more than one alternative hypothesis we may generalize ES's severity condition for type (i) cases as follows: Severity Condition: Hypothesis h is shown to be in error as a result of e' only if: given the set of auxiliary statements F, all An E F have been shown to pass severe tests.
Thus we have a necessary condition for the ES solution to Duhem's problem. In the next two sections I argue that ES cannot satisfy this condition. Hence, if it is not the case that all An have been shown to pass severe tests, then h is not shown to be in error as a result of e'. And if h is not shown to be in error as a result of e', then there are inadequate grounds for attributing the error to h. But any case in which there are inadequate grounds for attributing error to some hypothesis is a case of type (ii) and hence is not a solvable Duhem case. The upshot of our argument is that ES renders all cases type (ii) cases since it does not include an adequate account of when enough evidence is enough. To begin, one may suspect that the severity condition invites a kind of third-man argument. We'll call this the testing regress. One could add auxiliaries indefinitely to a typical set F of given auxiliaries thereby introducing an indefinite series of tests.2 Indeed, without restrictions on the auxiliary statements in F there are, in principle, an infinite number of tests. A recipe for inflating F in this manner is to randomly pick declarative sentences out of the language, without replacement, construct an auxiliary stating it doesn't affect the test hypothesis and then test whether the fac-2. Mayo, adopting Suppes' (Suppes 1969) notion of a model, presents ES "as a series of conceptual representations or models ranging from the primary scientific hypothesis or questions ... to the nitty gritty details of the generation and analysis of data" (Mayo 1996b, 128 Underlying this proposal, however, is the claim that these structures rest on good grounds. In other words, the error probabilities that underpin localized experiments must themselves be tested or shown to hold, even if only in principle. This last claim is essential for establishing ES's normative-epistemic credentials and is the target of my criticisms. It is essential because if it turns out that this structure cannot be accounted for within ES, then the claim that evidence isn't opaque is undermined: rejecting statements becomes more than a matter of evidence and method, at least as those notions are construed and employed within ES.
The Partition
The key then is the structure of F. According to Mayo, by demanding that each test be specific, we are forced to sort out what is relevant and, hence, what are likely sources of error. Each test then has a set of extraneous factors that we ignore or control for, and a smaller "relevant" set that we pay close attention to. This latter set of factors is just what our experiment is about; they are the target properties that are measured, examined, and from which we learn. For example, Adams and Laplace's test of the predicted acceleration 6 of the moon involved a set of auxiliary statements, including: A1: tidal friction is not sufficient to affect measured lunar acceleration more than 6+n; A2: instrument X's margin or error is not sufficient to produce measurements of lunar acceleration more than 6-n; A3: seasonal movements of migratory birds do not affect measured lunar acceleration more than 6+-n and so on. These three statements are a subset of the set of auxiliaries F for Adams and Laplace's test. The factors in this example are four target properties: Tidal friction (of some magnitude %), instrument accuracy, lunar acceleration, and collective bird force. To avoid the problems which beset Popper, Mayo's proposal is to assume that most of the auxiliaries in F are about properties that are irrelevant to the hypothesis under test (like bird force and, in the original experiment, tidal friction), and so may be ignored. This leaves a few auxiliaries that are controlled (like instrument error) and the test hypothesis involving the factors we are interested in. In the face of disagreeing evidence, we may have a hunch that the tidal friction auxiliary is a better hypothesis to reject than the bird-force auxiliary, but the promise of ES is the claim that there is an empirical method for justifying this preference; that is, that our decision is grounded by evidence and method alone 3. When r Is Finite. It is important to realize that the partition problem does not depend on F being an infinite set of statements. Even if we suppose that F is finite, the number of modalities generated by even toy experiments is sufficiently large to introduce the partition problem. To see this we'll look closely at an example Mayo borrows from R. A. Fisher.
Suppose there is a woman who claims to distinguish by taste alone whether tea or milk is added first to a mixture of tea and milk. Suppose we are interested in testing this claim. Let h be: Lady can discriminate order by taste, and let the null hypothesis h. be: Lady cannot discriminate order by taste. Fisher reasoned that someone who failed to discriminate the order by taste would do no better than chance at determining the correct order of the mixture. Thus, the question at hand (i.e., whether she has the ability) is reduced to considering two hypotheses h and ho. The binomial chance model is assumed to accurately model the results of her failing to have the ability. So, h is confirmed or "warranted" to the extent that the experimental record of her correct guesses differs significantly from the results of flipping a fair coin.
We infer whether her guesses are significantly different from flips of a fair coin from probability theory. Suppose we prepare 5 teacups for her to sample. This creates 25 possibilities, or 32 possible outcomes. The probability of choosing the correct milk-tea order by chance in all 5 cups is just the probability of picking one of the 32 possible sequences, or .03125. This probability is the probability of committing a Type-I error-i.e., the probability of accepting h (rejecting the null h.) when h is false.3
But notice an assumption that we are making to get this far in the example. Mayo writes that "in order for the comparison offered by the statistical link in the experimental model to go through, the assumptions of the experimental model must hold sufficiently in the actual experiment" 3. In a five-cup case, let c be the number of cups classified correctly. The probability of guessing c correctly is calculated by 2 We reject the null if c= 5, since the probability of c = 5 is 1/32, if ho is true. (Mayo 1996b, 136) . One assumption that must hold is that the subject isn't tipped off by something other than the taste of the samples. Since we are measuring the lady's ability to discriminate by taste, our confidence that we are only exposed to a 1 in 32 chance of her making the right choice all five times and yet not having the ability to do it by taste turns on this assumption holding. So, the very idea of a severe test is predicated on the assumption that the power of our test is quite high. Yet, on what grounds do we know that it is? As a first precaution, we might wish to randomize the order of the treatments so that we can avoid giving clues to the subject. We might begin by randomizing the order of the milk-tea mixture for each treatment, altering between milk first and tea first. We may even wish to randomize (or standardize) the presentation of the cups too, in case there is an ordering of the cups' masses, or rim thickness that correlates with the mixture order. Notice that what we are doing is controlling possible factors that may reduce our confidence in our probability assignment for Type-I errors. We've controlled for the possibility that the experimenter knowing the order of the mixture influences the subject's performance, and the possibility that a non-random order of the teacups may give a clue of the order to the subject, respectively.
What we are articulating is the class of auxiliaries to test and those to let pass. Specifically, we are describing the class of controlled factors that have corresponding auxiliaries in some ith partition of F: (Fi). Hence, implicitly we are fixing a partition. In designing our experiment we make judgments about what to include in the class of tested auxiliaries and what to push into our ceteris paribus condition. For instance, milk-tea mixture order and stirring are to be controlled for, randomizing the cups before presenting them to the experimenter might be a borderline case, and the make of the china most likely isn't considered a serious candidate at all. But how do we make these judgments about what to test and what to regard as extraneous? We might be tempted to cite our "good sense" or previous experience, if not for remembering Duhem's own solution to similar puzzles in the philosophy of experimental physics a century ago. That is, in so far as our previous experience can be codified into an empirical theory, we may ask on what grounds we accept it. The upshot is that even if we treat F as finite for toy experiments like tea tasting we can easily inflate it to a size that demands a partition. Yet once F is partitioned, we then create a set of n number i's and once again are faced with the problem of determining which partition to settle on.
A Partial Solution?
Mayo's solution to Duhem's problem fails because it depends on a given structure of the set of auxiliary statements that itself can't be justified by ES methods. Under ES we haven't good grounds to prefer one partition over another, and so haven't good grounds for considering contrary evidence to count against one hypothesis over another.
But even though we don't have a full solution to Duhem's problem, we might wonder whether ES provides a "partial" solution to the problem. Suppose we simply accept a certain partition as a matter of convention. ES might provide us with a means to test a limited number of viable alternatives against the current partition thereby giving us some empirical evidence that warrants selecting one over the other. While not solving Duhem's problem, this conventionalist approach might account for inductive practices within some agreed upon domain of inquiry; we might find solace knowing whether we can empirically compare our current theory to at least some others and have an empirical basis for evaluating the merits of alternatives vis-a-vis the current partition.4
Let's suppose we are given a particular partition of auxiliaries, Fi. What does accepting Fi tell us? Fi is a set of statements, after all, yet our interest lies in the factors those statements denote. Do we have the resources to compare 17 to 1j? It turns out that if we're to consider a revision, even when given a partition of 1, we still must construct a test akin to testing all n-partitions of F. Roughly speaking, to compare 1i and 1j we're forced to consider a test that eliminates any advantage accepting a particular structure of T gives. Simply accepting 1i doesn't provide us with enough information to effectively use ES to evaluate an alternative partition.
To see the problem let's return to the tea tasting example. To compare the ith and jth partition of F we first need to see what we know from starting with 1i. Suppose that the ith partition includes in the class of untested auxiliaries A4: Using city tap water is not correlated with the subject recording correct responses better than chance. In considering an alternative, 1j, how do we evaluate F7 if A4 E F1?
Since the city-water factor is under consideration we might wish to subject A4 to test. Suppose we do and there are inadequate grounds for rejecting A4. May we then infer that the city-waterfactor is not statistically relevant to the lady's ability to respond correctly better than chance? No, not as ES stands. The reason is that to do so would be to conclude that the city-water factor is independent of all other factors and, hence, not a constituent in a multi-factor effect. By accepting A4 we accept that the city-water factor alone isn't correlated with the subject performing better than chance, not that it has no effect at all. But suppose circumstances are such that it does affect the subject's performance, but only if the experiment uses unpasteurized milk and the tea kettle is brought to a rolling boil before pouring. In such circumstances it isn't the case that the city-water 4. Larry Laudan sketches a similar approach for ES in (Laudan 1997) . See also (Kyburg 1990). factor is irrelevant to the subject's performance. Yet, without keen theoretical knowledge that extends beyond merely accepting Fi, ES methods alone couldn't help us with detecting this multi-factor effect. So long as we follow Mayo's recommendation of equating "having good evidence" with "having a good test," we are forced to test each auxiliary in T that pairs the city-water factor with all permutations of other factors. But this is unreasonable, for among the set of auxiliaries to test is a superstatistic that treats all factors as controlled and whose set of untested auxiliaries is the empty set. Leaving aside the computational expense and incomprehensible size of such a statement, such a test renders ES epistemologically vacuous: for, again, it strips ES of the structure it needs to target evidence.
One might suggest that we group the auxiliaries into "stable factor sets" in an attempt to represent previous experience. Suppose we determine that our n-factor auxiliary is not statistically relevant, but we're curious about an n + 1 factor chain. Couldn't we cut down on the number of total statements by grouping together auxiliaries denoting factors that have proven steady losers? No; not as ES stands. Even if the auxiliary testing the set of factors {f1, f2 . . . A 'f } is not statistically relevant to the subject reporting correct guesses, we are without "good grounds" to infer that {f1, f2, f**A f,+ } is also not statistically relevant without testing the auxiliary denoting that set. Notice, too, that "good grounds" isn't monotonic either. In other words, even if {f1, f2 . .. .fn' } is found not statistically relevant we couldn't infer {f2 f,3 . . . Af, } isn't statistically relevant too without testing that factor chain. So long as good grounds is akin to a good test, we haven't a viable way to navigate the factor space and actually learn from error. The upshot is that accepting Fi doesn't amount to the kind of knowledge we need to guide our use of ES methods.
What is important to see is that we are forced not only to accept a ceteris paribus condition to test anything under ES, but must also rely on a robust knowledge base to direct those tests. The very idea of a severe test is predicated on having a very rich body of empirical knowledge that itself is warranted by means other than those provided by ES. To propose ES as account of experimental knowledge, then, is to have things turned around.
To the extent that ES solves Duhem's problem, even partially, it does so by relying heavily on a rich body of knowledge that can't be accounted for by ES methods. It is the great experimentalist who knows how to use her limited resources and theoretical knowledge to probe the factor space to maximize her chances of learning about the system under study. ES simply fails to give a philosophical account of how this is done.
The Problem for ES.
What is philosophically attractive about ES is its epistemic promise. Mayo's account is proposed as an account of how experimental knowledge claims are warranted. The crux of ES is Mayo's notion of a severe test. But the ES notion of a severe test fails to do its own epistemic work required for solving Duhem's problem. We direct the tools of ES in precisely the manner that Duhem's problem concerns. In the end, ES describes such inferences and fails to explain the grounds for our preferences. That we in fact reduce the size of the factor space and in fact seem to target evidence is not in dispute: what we want, and ES leaves wanting, is an account of how this is done.
In closing, note that this failure presents a pressing problem for ES in general. For Mayo appeals to a version of C. S. Peirce's thesis that inductive methods are "self-correcting" in order to justify ES methods.
By developing my view of Pierce's error-correcting justification of induction I will . . . be developing the justification I need for error statistical methods in science. The justification for these methods lies in their ability to control error probabilities, hence sustain learning from error, hence provide for the growth of experimental knowledge. (Mayo 1996b, 413) Yet, necessary for Mayo's version of Pierce's thesis is that "the [test] method should be able to detect its own errors in the sense of checking its own assumptions ... and it should be able to correct violations or 'subtract them out' in the analysis" (Mayo 1 996b, 421 ). But this, of course, is precisely what ES cannot do. The assumptions that distinguish good tests from bad are precisely those that cannot be checked by severe tests. In so far as an ES test identifies a statement to reject, it does so because of the wits of its designer, not the features of her test method.
